“The medicalization of love” – podcast interview
Just out today is a podcast interview for Smart Drug Smarts between host Jesse Lawler and interviewee Brian D. Earp on “The Medicalization of Love” (title taken from a recent paper with Anders Sandberg and Julian Savulescu, available from the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, here).
Below is the abstract and link to the interview:
Abstract
What is love? A loaded question with the potential to lead us down multiple rabbit holes (and, if you grew up in the 90s, evoke memories of the Haddaway song). In episode #95, Jesse welcomes Brian D. Earp on board for a thought-provoking conversation about the possibilities and ethics of making biochemical tweaks to this most celebrated of human emotions. With a topic like “manipulating love,” the discussion moves between the realms of neuroscience, psychology and transhumanist philosophy.
http://smartdrugsmarts.com/episode-95-medicalization-of-love/
Reference
Earp, B. D., Sandberg, A., & Savulescu, J. (2015). The medicalization of love. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 323–336.
Guest Post: Mental Health Disorders in Prison: Neuroethical and Societal Issues
Guest post by Barbara Sahakian,
FMedSci, DSc, a professor in the department of psychiatry at the University of Cambridge,
and president of the International Neuroethics Society.
This article was originally published on the Dana Foundation Blog, and can be read here: http://danablog.org/2015/07/28/mental-health-disorders-in-prison-neuroethical-and-societal-issues/
More than half of all prison and jail inmates have a mental health problem.[i] In addition, according to a 2010 report released by the Treatment Advocacy Center and the National Sheriffs’ Association,[ii] more mentally ill persons are in jails and prisons than in hospitals, and many of those remain untreated. Those in prison have a higher risk of substance abuse, and suicide rates are four to five times higher than within the general population.[iii] Deaths are also increased upon release, with the most common reasons being drug overdose, cardiovascular disease, homicide, and suicide.[iv]
Many people in prison have lower than average IQs, and it is well-established that lower IQ is a known risk factor for mental health problems.[v] Rates of problems for children in the youth justice system are at least three times higher than within the general population, and are highest amongst children in custody.[vi] Almost a quarter of children who offend have very low IQs of less than 70.[vii]
At the International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting 2015 in Chicago (Oct. 15-16), there will be a panel entitled, “Mental health disorders in prison: Neuroethical and societal issues,” which will consider vulnerabilities to mental health problems of those in prison, and whether there are inequalities in access to psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals for diagnosis and treatment. This panel will also reflect on what steps, in terms of improving cognition, functionality, and wellbeing, society should be taking to ensure better life trajectories when inmates with mental health problems are released.
For example, suicide mortality is reduced by antidepressant treatment,[viii] and there is evidence that for at least some disorders, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), treatment leads to a significant reduction in criminality rates in men (Lichtenstein et al, 2012).[ix] Effective treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders and education, including skill training in prisons, could help to increase cognitive reserve and resilience, helping prisoners successfully address the many challenges encountered on release.[x]
The highly distinguished panel includes Dr. James Blair, Dr. Laurie R. Garduque, and Professor Hank Greely. The panel’s moderator, Dr. Alan Leshner, has been director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, deputy director and acting director of the National Institute of Mental Health, and chief executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He was one of the first to highlight the neuroscientific evidence of brain changes in addiction.
[i] James DJ, Glaze LE (2006) Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 213600
[ii] Torrey E, Kennard A, Eslinger D, Lamb R, Pavle J (2010) More Mentally Ill Persons are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals: A Survey of the States. Treatment Advocacy Center.
[iii] Fazel S, Grann M, Kling B, Hawton K (2011) Prison suicide in 12 countries: An ecological study of 861 suicides during 2003–2007. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol, 46, 191-195.
[iv] Binswanger IA, Stern MF, Deyo RA, Heagerty PJ, Cheadle A, Elmore JG, Koepsell TD (2007) Release from prison: A high risk of death for former inmates. New England Journal of Medicine, 356, 157-165.
[v] Barnett JH, Salmond CH, Jones PB, Sahakian BJ (2006) Cognitive reserve in neuropsychiatry. Psychological Medicine, 36, 1053-1064.
[vi] Hagell A (2002) The mental health needs of young offenders—a report commissioned by the Mental Health Foundation MHF: London.
[vii] Harrington R, Bailey S (2005) Mental health needs and effectiveness of provision for young offenders in custody and in the community YJB: London.
[viii] Morgan OWC, Griffiths C, Majeed A (2004) Association between mortality from suicide in England and antidepressant prescribing: an ecological study. BMC Public Health, 4.
[ix] Lictenstein P, Halldner L, Zetterqvist J, Sjolander A, Serlachius E, Fazel S, Langstrom N, Larsson H (2012) Medication for attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder and criminality. The New England Journal of Medicine, 367.
[x] Beddington J, Cooper CL, Field J, Goswami U, Huppert FA, Jenkins R, Jones HS, Kirkwood TB, Sahakian BJ, Thomas SM (2008) The mental wealth of nations. Nature, 23, 1057-1060.
Guest Post: Must we throw out the brain with the bathwater? Marc Lewis on addiction
Written by Anke Snoek
Macquarie University
When neuroscience started to mingle into the debate on addiction and self-control, people aimed to use these insights to cause a paradigm shift in how we judge people struggling with addictions. People with addictions are not morally despicable or weak-willed, they end up addicted because drugs influence the brain in a certain way. Anyone with a brain can become addicted, regardless their morals. The hope was that this realisation would reduce the stigma that surrounds addiction. Unfortunately, the hoped for paradigm shift didn’t really happen, because most people interpreted this message as: people with addictions have deviant brains, and this view provides a reason to stigmatise them in a different way. Continue reading
Guest Post: Smart drugs, Smart choice
Written by Benjamin Pojer and Daniel D’Hotman
Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash University
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
A recent review published in the European Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology (1) on the efficacy and safety of modafinil in a population of healthy people has found that the drug “appears to consistently engender enhancement of attention, executive functions, and learning” without “preponderances for side effects or mood changes”. Modafinil, a medication prescribed in the treatment of narcolepsy and other sleep disorders, has gained popularity in recent years as a means of increasing alertness and focus. Informal surveys suggest that up to one in five undergraduate university students in the UK admit to using the drug as a study aid (2). Previously, the unknown safety profile of modafinil has been an obstacle to its more widespread use as a cognitive enhancer. Admittedly, the long-term consequences of modafinil use remain unclear, however, given its growing popularity, this gap in the literature should not preclude a discussion of the ethics of the drug’s use for cognitive enhancement. Continue reading
Stopping the innocent from pleading guilty
Written by Dr John Danaher.
Dr Danaher is a Lecturer in Law at NUI Galway. His research interests include neuroscience and law, human enhancement, and the ethics of artificial intelligence.
A version of this post was previously published here.
Somebody recently sent me a link to an article by Jed Radoff entitled “Why Innocent People Plead Guilty”. Radoff’s article is an indictment of the plea-bargaining system currently in operation in the US. Unsurprisingly given its title, it argues that the current system of plea bargaining encourages innocent people to plead guilty, and that something must be done to prevent this from happening.
I recently published a paper addressing the same problem. The gist of its argument is that I think that it may be possible to use a certain type of brain-based lie detection — the P300 Concealed Information Test (P300 CIT) — to rectify some of the problems inherent in systems of plea bargaining. The word “possible” is important here. I don’t believe that the technology is currently ready to be used in this way – I think further field testing needs to take place – but I don’t think the technology is as far away as some people might believe either.
What I find interesting is that, despite this, there is considerable resistance to the use of the P300 CIT in academic and legal circles. Some of that resistance stems from unwarranted fealty to the status quo, and some stems from legitimate concerns about potential abuses of the technology (miscarriages of justice etc.). I try to overcome some of this resistance by suggesting that the P300 CIT might be better than other proposed methods for resolving existing abuses of power within the system. Hence my focus on plea-bargaining and the innocence problem.
Anyway, in what follows I’ll try to give a basic outline of my argument. As ever, for the detail, you’ll have to read the original paper. Continue reading
Treatment for Crime Workshop (13th – 14th April) – Overview
Practical ethicists have become increasingly interested in the potential applications of neurointerventions—interventions that exert a direct biological effect on the brain. One application of these interventions that has particularly stimulated moral discussion is the potential use of these interventions to prevent recidivism amongst criminal offenders. To a limited extent, we are already on the path to using what can be described as neuro-interventions in this way. For instance, in certain jurisdictions drug-addicted offenders are required to take medications that are intended to attenuate their addictive desires. Furthermore, sex-offenders in certain jurisdictions may receive testosterone-lowering drugs (sometimes referred to as ‘chemical castration’) as a part of their criminal sentence, or as required by their conditions of parole.
On 13-14th April, a workshop (funded by the Wellcome Trust) focussing on the moral questions raised by the potential use of neuro-interventions to prevent criminal recidivism took place at Kellogg College in Oxford. I lack the space here to adequately explore the nuances of all of the talks in this workshop. Rather, in this post, I shall briefly explain some of the main themes and issues that were raised in the fruitful discussions that took place over the course of the workshop, and attempt to give readers at least a flavour of each of the talks given; I apologise in advance for the fact that I must necessarily gloss over a number of interesting details and arguments. Continue reading
“The Medicalization of Love” – call for peer commentaries – DUE SEPT 1
Announcement:
The paper, “The Medicalization of Love” by Brian D. Earp, Anders Sandberg, and Julian Savulescu, has been accepted for publication at the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. Scholars interested in submitting a short reply paper or peer commentary are encouraged to contact the editor, Tomi Kushner, at kushnertk@gmail.com.
The final deadline for commentaries/ papers is September 1st. The abstract for the paper is below; the accepted manuscript is available at this link. Inquiries to the editor should be sent as soon as possible.
Abstract
Pharmaceuticals or other emerging technologies could be used to enhance (or diminish) feelings of lust, attraction, and attachment in adult romantic partnerships. While such interventions could conceivably be used to promote individual (and couple) well-being, their widespread development and/or adoption might lead to “medicalization” of human love and heartache—for some, a source of serious concern. In this essay, we argue that the “medicalization of love” need not necessarily be problematic, on balance, but could plausibly be expected to have either good or bad consequences depending upon how it unfolds. By anticipating some of the specific ways in which these technologies could yield unwanted outcomes, bioethicists and others can help direct the course of love’s “medicalization”—should it happen to occur—more toward the “good” side than the “bad.”
Here is the link to the accepted manuscript.
* image from http://www.metalsucks.net/2014/02/16/sunday-lurve/.
Things I’ve learned (so far) about how to do practical ethics
Follow Brian on Twitter by clicking here.
Things I’ve learned (so far) about how to do practical ethics
I had the opportunity, a few months back, to look through some old poems I’d written in high school. Some, I thought, were pretty good. Others I remembered thinking were good when I wrote them, but now they seem embarrassingly bad: pseudo-profound, full of clichés, marked by empty rhetoric instead of meaningful content. I’ve had a similar experience today with my collection of articles here at the Practical Ethics blog. And Oh, the things I have learned!
Here are just a few of the lessons that have altered my thinking, or otherwise informed my views about “doing” practical ethics — particularly in a public-engagement context — since my very first blog post appeared in 2011:
Emergence’s devil haunts the moral enhancer’s kingdom come
It is 2025. Society has increasingly realised the importance of breaking evolution’s chains and enhancing the human condition. Large grants are awarded for building sci-fi-like laboratories to search for and create the ultimate moral enhancer. After just a few years, humanity believes it has made one of its most major breakthroughs: a pill which will rid our morality of all its faults. Without any side-effects, it vastly increases our ability to cooperate and to think rationally on moral issues, while also enhancing our empathy and our compassion for the whole of humanity. By shifting individuals’ socio-value orientation towards cooperation, this pill will allow us to build safe, efficient and peaceful societies. It will cast a pro-social paradise on earth, the moral enhancer kingdom come.
I believe we better think twice before endeavouring ourselves into this pro-social paradise on the cheap. Not because we will lose “the X factor”, not because it will violate autonomy, and not because such a drug would cause us to exit our own species. Even if all those objections are refuted, even if the drug has no side-effects, even if each and every human being, by miracle, willingly takes the drug without any coercion whatsoever, even then, I contend we could still have trouble.
Could ad hominem arguments sometimes be OK?
Follow Brian on Twitter by clicking here.
Could ad hominem arguments sometimes be OK?
You aren’t supposed to make ad hominem arguments in academic papers — maybe not anywhere. To get us on the same page, here’s a quick blurb from Wikipedia:
An ad hominem (Latin for “to the man” or “to the person”), short for argumentum ad hominem, is a general category of fallacies in which a claim or argument is rejected on the basis of some irrelevant fact about the author of or the person presenting the claim or argument. Ad hominem reasoning is normally categorized as an informal fallacy, more precisely as a genetic fallacy, a subcategory of fallacies of irrelevance.
Some initial thoughts. First, there are some clear cut cases where an ad hominem argument is plainly worthless and simply distracting: it doesn’t help us understand things better; it doesn’t wend toward truth. Let’s say that a philosopher makes an argument, X, concerning (say) abortion; and her opponent points out that the philosopher is (say) a known tax cheat — an attempt to discredit her character. Useless. But let’s say that a psychologist makes an argument, Y, about race and IQ (i.e., that black people are less “intelligent” than white people), and his opponent points out that he used to be a member of the KKK. Well, it’s still useless in one sense, in that the psychologist’s prior membership in the KKK can’t by itself disprove his argument; but it does seem useful in another sense, in that it might give us at least a plausible reason to be a little bit more cautious in interpreting the psychologist’s results.
Affiliations
Recent Comments