Panpsychism and Moral Status
Panpsychism is the view that sentience is ubiquitous in the world. Some people find it attractive because it sidesteps the challenge for dualists of explaining why there are two radically different types of things in the world, physical things and mental things. And panpsychism seems to avoid some of of the challenges that face physicalist accounts of consciousness of explaining how mental properties are related to physical properties; since pan-psychism says that “mentality” is everywhere, the task left for cognitive scientists is simply to explain why that mentality is organized in a particular way rather than needing to directly address the “hard problem of consciousness'” head on.
Many people also find sentientism, the view that sentience is sufficient for moral status, attractive. So it can be tempting to combine panpsychism and sentientism and conclude that we can assume that all animals, including oysters, snails, and fruit flies, must necessarily have moral status. This move is a mistake.
The problem with the above move is that it rests on an equivocation on the term “sentient.” One definition of sentient means “the ability to feel pleasure and pain.” Another definition means “the ability to have any types of conscious experiences.” The link to moral status requires the first definition of sentience. But panpsychism, if true, only entails the second.
Beyond just the definitions, it certainly seems like there are a lot of experiences that are neither positive nor negative…they are simply neutral. So the fact that some experiences occurred doesn’t tell us that anything morally significant occurred in the absence of further knowledge about what types of experiences they were, even for a sentientist.
But what about observing avoidance behaviour? If we see that, and we think that mentality is everywhere, shouldn’t we conclude that the avoidance behaviour is indicative of suffering? But this seems contrary to what we know about pain. People can still have withdrawal reactions that rely on spinal reflexes, even when they self-report that they don’t feel pain. In fact, in rare cases, people even report feeling pains but not finding them unpleasant.
So panpsychism doesn’t really sidestep the challenge of determining which types of behaviours in nonverbal populations are indicative of positive or negative experiences. They may avoid having to take on the hard problem of consciousness but they are left with the hard problem of morally relevant consciousness.
Pain for Ethicists #2: Is the Cerebral Cortex Required for Pain? (Video)
Here’s my presentation from the UQAM 2018 Summer School in Animal Cognition organised by Stevan Harnad:
I also highly recommend Jonathan Birch’s talk on Animal Sentience and the Precautionary Principle and Lars Chittka’s amazing presentation about the minds of bees.
Thanks again to EA Grants for supporting this research as well as my home institutions Uehiro & WEH. And thanks to Mélissa Desrochers for the video.
You can find the first Pain for Ethicists post here.
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Adam Shriver is a Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities.
Pain for Ethicists: What is the Affective Dimension of Pain?
This is my first post in a series highlighting current pain science that is relevant to philosophers writing about well-being and ethics. My work on this topic has been supported by the W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics, the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, as well as a generous grant from Effective Altruism Grants.
There have been numerous published cases in the scientific literature of patients who, for various reasons, report feeling pain but not finding the pain unpleasant. As Daniel Dennett noted in his seminal paper “Why You Can’t Make A Computer That Feels Pain,” these reports seem to be at odds with some of our most basic intuitions about pain, in particular the conjunction of our intuitions that ‘‘a pain is something we mind’’ and ‘‘we know when we are having a pain.’’ Dennett was discussing the effects of morphine, but similar dissociations have been reported in patients who undergo cingulotomies to treat terminal cancer pain and in extremely rare cases called “pain asymbolia” involving damage to the insula cortex. Continue reading
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