The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has recently published a consultation paper entitled Give and Take? Human Bodies in Medicine and Research: https://consultation.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/Human_bodies_in_medicine_and_research_consultation_paper.pdf The paper seeks responses from individuals or groups on a wide range of issues relating to the use of human bodies or body parts in medical treatment and research. Section 6 is on… Read More »For Sale: Body Parts?
Michael Ruse begins a recent short essay on what Darwin might teach us about morality with a striking question and an even more striking answer: ‘God is dead, so why should I be good? The answer is that there are no grounds whatsoever for being good. There is no celestial headmaster who is going to… Read More »Is Morality Flimflam?
The title of Robin Dunbar’s recently published book asks a good question: How many friends does one person need? (http://www.faber.co.uk/work/how-many-friends-does-one-person-need/9780571253425/)
Dunbar suggests that a human being can’t have more than about 150 friends (or ‘acquaintances’, as the book itself somewhat revealingly puts it). But of course it all depends on who we count as a ‘friend’. If we are talking about people with whom one spends a good deal of one’s time, then the number would usually be significantly lower; whereas if we allow friends to include what Aristotle called philoi, it could be much larger. People are philoi when they have some kind of goodwill to one another, and are mutually aware of that goodwill (Nicomachean Ethics VIII.2). On this generous view, even Facebook ‘friends’ one has never met might be genuine, if those extending and accepting the invitation do have some real concern for one another.
Much attention has been paid over the last week or so to An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK, a government-sponsored study which has taken over ten years to produce: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/jan/27/unequal-britain-report
The study contains a huge amount of data, much of it on the gaps between richer and poorer groups. It turns out, for example, that the richest 10% own about one hundred times as the poorest 10%. Many appear to think that such inequality is obviously, in itself, a bad thing — something any government, especially one with its roots in socialism, ought to be doing something about. But in fact this is far from obvious. Imagine that each person in the poorest group were earning £100,000 p.a., and each in the richest group £10,000,000. Such a result would be described as an economic and political miracle. Or imagine that the government sought to deal with the real gaps between rich and poor merely by 'levelling down' the income of the rich to that of the poor. Given the absence of any trickling down, and the effects on incentives, the outcome of such a policy might well be to make everyone, both existing rich and existing poor, even poorer than they are now. The fact that the gap would have disappeared seems irrelevant in a situation when all have been made worse off.
There has been a good deal of discussion about obesity recently, since the Royal College of Surgeons criticized access to weight loss operations in the UK as a ‘postcode lottery’: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/21/morbid-obesity-gastric-bands-nhs-costs
One common response – for example by Catherine Bennett in The Observer ( http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/24/homeopathy-obesity-gastric-bands ) has been that the question of unfairness shouldn’t be permitted to arise in the first place. Obesity, since it is self-inflicted, should not be treated by the NHS at all. Rather, the money should be spent on treatments for involuntary ailments, such as cataract operations or hip replacements.
Against this, it could be argued that interventions to cause weight loss, such as gastric bands, are in fact a highly effective use of NHS resources, since (a) they tend to work pretty well and (b) they save the costs of further treatment down the line for conditions which would otherwise have been caused by the obesity. This argument, however, fails to deal with the original deflection of responsibility for obesity onto the sufferers themselves. If they bring obesity on themselves, which then gives rise to further medical problems, then plausibly they have brought those problems on themselves as well. The NHS should refrain from treatment throughout.
The Copenhagen climate change summit begins today, and will run for two weeks: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/copenhagen . The aim of this UN meeting is to establish agreements to succeed the Kyoto protocol, in the hope ultimately of limiting global warming to a maximum of 2˚C. After the disappointing results of the negotiations in Barcelona in September, it is looking unlikely that such agreements will emerge from Copenhagen. But it can be hoped that Copenhagen will play an important role in establishing a basis for further negotiations over the next few years. If those negotations fail, then there is a non-trivial risk that the overall quality of human life on the planet will plummet, or even that the earth will no longer be able to sustain human life at all.
As Paul Ewart points out in an interesting recent Guardian article ‘Why God Needs Chance’ —
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/nov/03/god-chance-philosophy-atheism — chance events which result in certain individuals’ suffering undeservedly raise a version of the traditional ‘problem of evil’ for theists. If God, who is meant to be all-good and omnipotent, were to exist, how could he allow such chance events to occur?
Ewart goes on to argue that, if God is indeed to be omnipotent, chance may in fact be required. Here’s how I understand his argument. If the outcomes of our actions were entirely predictable, and we had free will, we could, in theory, force God to act to prevent some bad outcome. ‘So’, Ewart says, ‘God would no longer be in control – his actions would be determined by ours.’ But, because of chance, we can’t in fact predict the outcomes of our actions for sure, so we’re unable to distinguish what would be an act of God from a random event. So God remains omnipotent, because we can’t force him to act.
Kerrie Wooltorton is believed to have been the first person to use a living will as part of a successful attempt to commit suicide: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/01/living-will-suicide-legal . The 26-year-old wrote her will, and then three days later took poison and called an ambulance. The will said that no steps were to be taken to prolong her life, and that she desired only to be made as comfortable as possible and not to die alone.
If doctors had kept her alive, they may have been open to legal action. Indeed any interference with Wooltorton against her wishes could have been interpreted as an assault. But might there nevertheless be a moral case for ignoring a living will in such circumstances?
The moral debate about whether Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the man convicted for the Lockerbie bombing, should have been released has now morphed into a political debate about who wanted what and who said what to whom: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2009/sep/07/ed-balls-abdelbaset-al-megrahi . But the moral debate itself remains unresolved.
Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that (a) Megrahi was guilty as charged, (b) his trial was procedurally just, (c) he deserved his sentence, and (d) he is very close to death. Those who opposed freeing Megrahi tended to concentrate on (a)-(c), especially (a) and (c), as if that settled the matter. But of course those who supported freeing him believe that there was a case, based on compassion or mercy in response to (d), for releasing him before he had finished his sentence. What is going on here?
Professor Henry Markram, Director of the Blue Brain Project in Switzerland, has told a conference in Oxford that an artificial human brain is achievable within a decade: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/5894875/Artificial-human-brain-could-be-built-in-next-decade.html What would count as a ‘human brain’ is debatable, of course, but the prospect of an artificial grounding for cognitive and other mental functions raises many fundamental… Read More »Artificial Brains and Personal Identity
