I’ve just returned from Malta where I came across a story that I had missed at the time. A decade ago a Catholic woman from the Maltese island of Gozo gave birth to conjoined twins. Doctors said the twins would both die unless they were operated on; but if this operation went ahead only one of the babies would survive.
The UK police has an estimated 5.3 million DNA profiles in its databases, of which about 850,000 are of people who were never convicted of any crime (including 24,000 samples of youngsters who have never been convicted, cautioned or charged with any offence). Although the European Court ruled that a policy of retaining profiles of innocent people is illegal, the Home Office seems keen to retain them anyway, at least for serious crimes. Now it is claimed by a police officer that police in Camden deliberately target young people who have not been arrested yet in order to obtain DNA samples. According to him it is part of a long-term crime prevention strategy to discourage future crime. But does pre-emptive acquisition of DNA profiles make sense as crime prevention?
Read More »Precrime in Camden: using DNA profiles for crime prevention
Both within and outside ethics, people often worry about disagreements that are purely about value. Suppose that you and I completely agree about all the empirical facts about some case, yet you think that it’s absolutely forbidden to do something and I think there is absolutely nothing wrong with it. It can seem hard to see how we could ever resolve our disagreement. If after I have carefully considered the case, and still see nothing wrong, what could you possibly say that would make me see things in a different light?
Things are often a bit more complicated than this. For example, even if we agree on all the empirical facts, our moral disagreement might be due to disagreement about some metaphysical matter—say, about whether a foetus is a person. Metaphysical disagreements are also extremely hard to resolve. Then there is the old point that the way we frame factual matters, or the way we interpret some empirical evidence, might itself be shaped by our values.
Anyway, this is a common worry. But when it comes to many heated disagreements about scientific or technological advances, this worry seems to me to get the situation exactly backwards.
A
provocative article soon to be published in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
argues that parental consent should not be a prerequisite for neonatal
euthanasia. At present, the only country to permit neonatal euthanasia is the
The Netherlands. Medical personnel there are not prosecuted for actively
euthanizing infants in great suffering, provided that they satisfy the
requirements of the Groningen Protocol, which include obtaining consent from
the infant's parents. In the forthcoming article, Jacob Appel argues that the
requirement for parental consent should be dropped.
Let's first consider the question of whether it
could be ethically permissible for medical staff to end the life of a child
without the consent of the parents.
Ticking time-bomb cases have played a tremendous role in discourse regarding the moral status of interrogational torture. In terms of the philosophical literature, an early formulation owes to a seminal essay by Henry Shue:
[S]uppose a fanatic, perfectly willing to die rather than collaborate in the thwarting of his own scheme, has set a hidden nuclear device to explode in the heart of Paris. There is no time to evacuate the innocent people or even the movable art treasures—the only hope of preventing tragedy is to torture the perpetrator, find the device, and deactivate it.
The former head of the British Medical Association, Sir Sandy Macara, has called for the Measles Mumps and Rubella immunisation (MMR) to be a compulsory requirement prior to school entry. The UK has seen a surge in cases of measles over the last couple of years because of a fall in the immunisation rate. Many parents have chosen not to immunise their children as a result of the supposed (and now completely discredited) link between MMR and autism. Immunisation rates have fallen to 70% in some parts of the country. Is compulsory immunisation the answer, and if so, what degree of compulsion should we adopt?
In a recent article in The Observer the publication of a scientific article presenting evidence in favour of a new theory about the fate of the Neanderthals was reported (See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/may/17/neanderthals-cannibalism-anthropological-sciences-journal). According to this new theory, modern humans ate the Neanderthals!
Neanderthals flourished in Europe and Western Asia between 130,000 years and 30,000 years ago. Homo Sapiens are believed to have moved into Europe approximately 30,000 years ago, so it is certainly possible that the two overlapped and that the reason that there are no more Neanderthals is that they ended up in our stomachs. On the other hand it is also possible, as competing theories have it, that the Neanderthals interbred with modern humans and were assimilated into the larger group and it is also possible that Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens had little or no interaction and that the Neanderthals died out as a consequence of the changing climate and other environmental factors. Much remains unknown about the Neanderthals. We do not know how many of them there were and we do not know whether it was actually possible for them to interbreed with modern humans.
Starting with the financial crisis back in autumn it seems that greed and poor judgement are two persistent themes this year. While mankind was not entirely unfamiliar with the plague of greed prior to October 2008, recent events have meant that hardly a day goes by when such vicious matters do not make the headlines in one form or another. Attending an Oxford college ceremony the other day gave a bit of a historical perspective on how to deal with greed. The ‘pennies from the tower’ ceremony involved (or used to involve in times prior to current health and safety regulations) inviting a group of impoverished children onto the college lawn and then letting the pennies rain down from the tower above. But as they started to scurry around, fighting each other for the coins, they noticed that the pennies were hot. Piping hot. This was considered an excellent way to teach the children that greed is a vice and that there is no such thing as a free lunch. No doubt the blisters on their little hands would have served as an efficient reminder of this harsh lesson. One of the problems with this practice is it is far from clear that brute force the best way to introduce more positive values and behavioural patterns in people. Indeed, it is not even clear that the threat of punishment and public humiliation works as a deterrent.
Japanese researchers have genetically modified marmoset monkeys, and demonstrated that the modification can be inherited by their offspring. The modification was the standard green fluorescent protein making the monkey's glow green under UV light, a marker to demonstrate that the modification worked (BBC shows a picture of their feet glowing "an eerie green", while the picture in Nature's News and Views shows the cute monkeys in normal light and the original paper shows both). The long-term aim is to be able to produce transgenic primates that could act as disease models for humans – many conditions do not map well onto mice and rats. But is it acceptable to introduce heritable illness conditions into animals?
Testimonial power is the power we have to determine the opinion of others by testifying. To testify is to make sincere assertions in such circumstances under which we are understood to be offering those assertions as to be worth relying upon. When things go well, we tell people what we know and they come to know it through our telling them. We all have varying degrees of testimonial power relative to subject matter, to circumstance, to our knowledge and to what we are known by others to know.
Forensic experts are granted immense testimonial power. Their testimony is taken to be sufficient for conviction in the absence of any other evidence. Judges are reluctant to delve into the grounds of their expertise or into underlying disagreements among experts on the meaning of forensic evidence or the basis of interpretation. Their claims are taken to be backed by the epistemic authority of scientific method.
I do not think that forensic experts presently warrant the testimonial power they have been granted.
