by Dominic Wilkinson @NeonatalEthics
Over on the Journal of Medical Ethics blog are a couple of posts that might be of interest to Practical Ethics readers.
Last week, the journal published online an article by Cristina Richie on carbon caps and IVF. She argues that the environmental costs of reproduction should lead to carbon caps on IVF, and more restrictive public access to artificial reproduction.
Iain Brasssington wrote a blog in response, ‘ARTs in a warming world‘. He wrote:
“while reproduction may be a good, it is not the only good at which persons or policies may or should aim; and there are times when two goods conflict. Neither is it too strange to suggest that there are times when a person should abandon one good because of the greater moral gravity of some other, greater, good. It’s possible that reproduction is one of those goods.”
I also wrote a blog in response to Richie, arguing that “Gaia doesn’t care where your baby comes from“. From an environmental point of view there seems little reason to place limits on artificial but not natural reproduction, or to restrict publicly funded IVF (as Richie suggests) to the “biologically infertile”.
Finally, Iain wrote a follow-up piece about conflicts of interest and ethical analysis. Some had criticised Richie’s arguments on potentially ad hominem grounds. Brassington argues (persuasively) that what matters are the arguments, not their origins.
[Feel free to comment over on the JME blog]
by Dominic Wilkinson (@NeonatalEthics)
Lord Falconer’s assisted dying bill is being debated today in the House of Lords. In the past week or two there has discussion in the media of many of the familiar arguments for and against such a proposal. As Roger Crisp noted in yesterday’s post, there have been relatively few new arguments. Supporters of the bill refer to compassion for the terminally ill, the difficulty of adequately relieving suffering, and patients’ right to make fundamental choices about the last stage of their lives. Opponents of the bill express their compassion for the terminally ill and those with disabilities, fear about coercion, and the omnipresent slippery slope.
One concern that has been raised about the assisted dying bill is the fear of abuse in the setting of an overstretched public health system. For example, Penny Pepper, writing in the Guardian notes that “Cuts to social care are monstrous…How would the enactment of the Falconer bill work if brought to our harassed NHS?”
So claims renowned Oxford philosopher and feminist Janet Radcliffe Richards. Professor Radcliffe Richards is the author of The Sceptical Feminist, Human Nature After Darwin and Careless Thought Costs Lives: the ethics of transplants. She was also listed recently as one of the world’s 50 most important thinkers by Prospect magazine.
Writing in the Journal of Practical Ethics, Radcliffe Richards criticises a common view about sexual equality.
Women hold only 11% of executive positions in top companies in Europe. There are public campaigns to achieve gender balance in public office and top positions in corporations. Political parties are criticised for having low numbers of women in parliament or cabinet.
But Radcliffe Richards argues that society should not be aiming for equal representation of men and women in these ways.
Sex equality sounds self-evident as a requirement of justice, but we need to be clear about exactly what kind of equality is required.
There is much confusion between two quite different kinds of equality, and only one of them is relevant to justice between women and men.
Justice does not require equality of status, wealth, or any other outcome between the sexes. What matters from a moral point of view is equal consideration of interests, which is quite different.
Radcliffe Richards agrees that policies to increase the representation of women in influential areas are of great importance. But she argues that they need a different kind of justification. Recognizing this should make a significant difference to the politics of sex.
See here for the free full text article in the latest issue of the Journal of Practical Ethics.
The Journal of Practical Ethics is a new open access philosophy journal, published by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. The journal aims to make philosophy relevant to public debate and practical questions. It publishes works by leading academic moral and political philosophers that are accessible to a broader public audience.
Originally posted on the OUP blog. Reposted with the permission of the author
Tony Hope is a Uehiro fellow, Emeritus Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of Oxford and the author of Medical Ethics: A Very Short Introduction.
Science and morality are often seen as poles apart. Doesn’t science deal with facts, and morality with, well, opinions? Isn’t science about empirical evidence, and morality about philosophy? In my view this is wrong. Science and morality are neighbours. Both are rational enterprises. Both require a combination of conceptual analysis, and empirical evidence. Many, perhaps most moral disagreements hinge on disagreements over evidence and facts, rather than disagreements over moral principle.
Consider the recent child euthanasia law in Belgium that allows a child to be killed – as a mercy killing – if: (a) the child has a serious and incurable condition with death expected to occur within a brief period; (b) the child is experiencing constant and unbearable suffering; (c) the child requests the euthanasia and has the capacity of discernment – the capacity to understand what he or she is requesting; and, (d) the parents agree to the child’s request for euthanasia. The law excludes children with psychiatric disorders. No one other than the child can make the request.
Is this law immoral?
The BBC reports today on a recent organ donation initiative in Brazil. This initiative has led to a 400% increase in the numbers of heart transplants in a local hospital. The waiting list for organs in the city of Recife reportedly dropped to zero in the first year after introduction of this innovation.
What sort of initiative could lead to such a dramatic increase in organ donation numbers? Continue reading
On the 22nd of October 1707, more than 1400 British sailors died when a British naval fleet sank in stormy weather off the Isles of Scilly. The disaster was later attributed to failings in navigation and sailors’ difficulty in determining their location at sea. This was a perennial problem at the time, and had persisted despite intense scientific research. Seven years later, the UK government passed the Longitude Act, offering 20,000 pounds (more than 2 million pounds in today’s money) to anyone who could develop a method for reliably determining longitude at sea. The longitude prize was eventually won by John Harrison, a self-educated Lincolnshire clockmaker.
Yesterday, 300 years after the original Longitude act, the UK Technology Strategy Board launched a £10 million pound prize competition, a new ‘Longitude prize’. The money will be awarded to a scientist or group of scientists who come up with a solution to one of a set of major global challenges – inadequate food/clean water supply for everyone, antibiotic resistance, spinal cord injury, dementia, the large carbon impact of air-flight.
The new Longitude prize is the latest in a series of innovation inducement competitions over time. These competitions have offered monetary rewards for solving problems as diverse as the development of butter substitutes, the first trans-Atlantic air flight, reusable aircraft for space flight, or an alternative fertilizer to bird poo. One novel feature of the 2014 Longitude prize is that it is seeking public input into the specific challenge to be targeted. Public voting will decide which of the six global challenges above are to be the focus of the prize.
But are innovation prizes an effective or appropriate way to solve major global scientific challenges? Continue reading
The newspapers today are full of the horrifying story of three children who were found dead in their family home in South London on Tuesday. The children had all apparently been diagnosed with a severe genetic disorder (spinal muscular atrophy), that was likely to lead to death in early childhood. Their mother has today been charged with their murder.
There are relatively few details available at this stage, and doubtless more will emerge over coming days and months. It would be premature to comment on the specific circumstances of the case (and the family has asked the public and media to refrain from speculation). However, it is likely that as those details do emerge that commentary on the case will take up one of two themes. Some commentators will point to the enormous strain of caring for severely disabled and terminally ill children, and perhaps bemoan the lack of available supportive services. Others (perhaps with disability or with personal experience of caring for the disabled) will react with horror at the idea of a parent killing their child, and reject any attempt to use child disability as a form of excuse for the crime. Continue reading
There are reports in the press this week that the remains of 86 unborn fetuses were kept in a UK hospital mortuary for months or even years longer than they should have been. The majority were fetuses less than 12 weeks gestation. According to the report, this arose because of administrative error and a failure to obtain the necessary permissions for cremation.
The hospital has publicly apologized, and set up an enquiry into the error. They are planning to cremate the remaining fetuses. However, they have decided not to contact all of the families and women whose fetal remains were kept on the basis that this would likely cause a greater amount of distress.
Is this the right approach? Guidelines and teaching in medical schools encourage health-care professionals and institutions to own up to their errors and disclose them to patients. Is it justifiable then to not reveal errors on the grounds that this would be too upsetting? How much transparency is desirable in healthcare?
The Guardian newspaper has today launched a campaign to end female genital mutilation (FGM). This coincides with evidence that, despite being illegal, a significant number of young women from the UK undergo the practice. Globally, more than 125 million living women have had some form of FGM performed.