law

Guest Post: Abortion, punishment and moral consistency

Written by: Rajiv Shah, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

Donald Trump suggested that women who have abortions should face punishment. For that he was criticised by both the pro-choice side and the pro-life side. The latter claimed that their view is that women should not face punishment for having abortions but that only providers should. This raises the interesting question of whether the pro-life position is coherent. It would seem that it is not. If the foetus has the right to life then having an abortion is like murder and so those who abort should be treated as such. This post argues that the pro-lifer can coherently reject this implication whilst still holding that the foetus has the right to life. Since it considers the responses a pro-lifer could make this post will assume for the sake of argument that the foetus does have a right to life. Continue reading

Does the desire to punish have any place in modern justice?

Professor Neil Levy, visiting Leverhulme Lecturer, University of Oxford, has recently published a provocative essay at Aeon online magazine:

Human beings are a punitive species. Perhaps because we are social animals, and require the cooperation of others to achieve our goals, we are strongly disposed to punish those who take advantage of us. Those who ‘free-ride’, taking benefits to which they are not entitled, are subject to exclusion, the imposition of fines or harsher penalties. Wrongdoing arouses strong emotions in us, whether it is done to us, or to others. Our indignation and resentment have fuelled a dizzying variety of punitive practices – ostracism, branding, beheading, quartering, fining, and very many more. The details vary from place to place and time to culture but punishment has been a human universal, because it has been in our evolutionary interests. However, those evolutionary impulses are crude guides to how we should deal with offenders in contemporary society.

Our moral emotions fuel our impulses toward retribution. Retributivists believe that people should be punished because that’s what they deserve. Retributivism is not the only justification for punishment, of course. We also punish to deter others, to prevent the person offending again, and perhaps to rehabilitate the offender. But these consequentialist grounds alone cannot justify our current system of criminal justice. We want punishments to ‘fit the crime’ – the worse the crime, the worse the punishment – without regard for the evidence of whether it ‘works’, that is, without thinking about punishment in consequentialist terms.

See here for the full article, and to join in the conversation.

Professor Levy has also written on this topic in the Journal of Practical Ethics; Less Blame, Less Crime? The Practical Implications of Moral Responsibility Skepticism.

Guest Post: Vampire Judges and Blood Money: Blood Donation as Criminal Sanction?

Written by Christopher Chew

Monash University

Early one September morning, plaintiffs at a rural Alabama County court in the US, were greeted with an unexpected and highly unusual offer. To quote presiding Judge Marvin Wiggins:

“There’s a blood drive outside, and if you don’t have any money, and you don’t want to go to jail, as an option to pay it, you can give blood today…bring in a receipt indicating you gave blood…as a discount rather than putting you in jail…or the sheriff has enough handcuffs for those who do not have money.” Continue reading

Guest Post: Is it Time for Ethics Experts in Lack of Consent Cases?

Written by Daniel Sokol

 barrister and medical ethicist at 12 King’s Bench Walk, Temple, London

This article was first published in the Personal Injury Brief Update Law Journal on 12th October 2015 (http://www.pibriefupdate.com)

Following the landmark case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, I have been instructed on several cases of alleged failure to obtain valid consent.

At present, consultants in the relevant specialty are asked to produce expert reports on the quality of the consent process.  The reports are, generally, of dubious value.

Medical expertise is not ethical expertise Continue reading

Guest Post: Mental Health Disorders in Prison: Neuroethical and Societal Issues

 Guest post by Barbara Sahakian,

FMedSci, DSc, a professor in the department of psychiatry at the University of Cambridge,

and president of the International Neuroethics Society.

This article was originally published on the Dana Foundation Blog, and can be read here: http://danablog.org/2015/07/28/mental-health-disorders-in-prison-neuroethical-and-societal-issues/

More than half of all prison and jail inmates have a mental health problem.[i] In addition, according to a 2010 report released by the Treatment Advocacy Center and the National Sheriffs’ Association,[ii] more mentally ill persons are in jails and prisons than in hospitals, and many of those remain untreated. Those in prison have a higher risk of substance abuse, and suicide rates are four to five times higher than within the general population.[iii] Deaths are also increased upon release, with the most common reasons being drug overdose, cardiovascular disease, homicide, and suicide.[iv]

Many people in prison have lower than average IQs, and it is well-established that lower IQ is a known risk factor for mental health problems.[v] Rates of problems for children in the youth justice system are at least three times higher than within the general population, and are highest amongst children in custody.[vi] Almost a quarter of children who offend have very low IQs of less than 70.[vii]

At the International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting 2015 in Chicago (Oct. 15-16), there will be a panel entitled, “Mental health disorders in prison: Neuroethical and societal issues,” which will consider vulnerabilities to mental health problems of those in prison, and whether there are inequalities in access to psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals for diagnosis and treatment. This panel will also reflect on what steps, in terms of improving cognition, functionality, and wellbeing, society should be taking to ensure better life trajectories when inmates with mental health problems are released.

For example, suicide mortality is reduced by antidepressant treatment,[viii] and there is evidence that for at least some disorders, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), treatment leads to a significant reduction in criminality rates in men (Lichtenstein et al, 2012).[ix] Effective treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders and education, including skill training in prisons, could help to increase cognitive reserve and resilience, helping prisoners successfully address the many challenges encountered on release.[x]

The highly distinguished panel includes Dr. James Blair, Dr. Laurie R. Garduque, and Professor Hank Greely. The panel’s moderator, Dr. Alan Leshner, has been director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, deputy director and acting director of the National Institute of Mental Health, and chief executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He was one of the first to highlight the neuroscientific evidence of brain changes in addiction.

[i] James DJ, Glaze LE (2006) Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 213600

[ii] Torrey E, Kennard A, Eslinger D, Lamb R, Pavle J (2010) More Mentally Ill Persons are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals: A Survey of the States. Treatment Advocacy Center.

[iii] Fazel S, Grann M, Kling B, Hawton K (2011) Prison suicide in 12 countries: An ecological study of 861 suicides during 2003–2007. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol, 46, 191-195.

[iv] Binswanger IA, Stern MF, Deyo RA, Heagerty PJ, Cheadle A, Elmore JG, Koepsell TD (2007) Release from prison: A high risk of death for former inmates. New England Journal of Medicine, 356, 157-165.

[v] Barnett JH, Salmond CH, Jones PB, Sahakian BJ (2006) Cognitive reserve in neuropsychiatry. Psychological Medicine, 36, 1053-1064.

[vi] Hagell A (2002) The mental health needs of young offenders—a report commissioned by the Mental Health Foundation MHF: London.

[vii] Harrington R, Bailey S (2005) Mental health needs and effectiveness of provision for young offenders in custody and in the community YJB: London.

[viii] Morgan OWC, Griffiths C, Majeed A (2004) Association between mortality from suicide in England and antidepressant prescribing: an ecological study. BMC Public Health, 4.

[ix] Lictenstein P, Halldner L, Zetterqvist J, Sjolander A, Serlachius E, Fazel S, Langstrom N, Larsson H (2012) Medication for attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder and criminality. The New England Journal of Medicine, 367.

[x] Beddington J, Cooper CL, Field J, Goswami U, Huppert FA, Jenkins R, Jones HS, Kirkwood TB, Sahakian BJ, Thomas SM (2008) The mental wealth of nations. Nature, 23, 1057-1060.

Do I have a right to access my father’s genetic account?

 Written By: Roy Gilbar, Netanya Academic College, Israel, and Charles Foster

In the recent case of ABC v St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust and others,1 [http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2015/1394.html] a High Court judge decided that:

(a) where the defendants (referred to here jointly as ‘X’) knew that Y, a prisoner,  was suffering from Huntingdon’s Disease (‘HD’); and

(b) X knew that Y had refused permission to tell Y’s daughter, Z (the claimant), that he had HD (and accordingly that there was a 50% chance that Z had it (and that if Z had it there was, correspondingly, a 50% chance that the fetus she was then carrying would have HD),

X had no duty to tell Z that Y was suffering from HD. Z said that if she had known of Y’s condition, she would have had an abortion. Continue reading

Stopping the innocent from pleading guilty

Written by Dr John Danaher.

Dr Danaher is a Lecturer in Law at NUI Galway. His research interests include neuroscience and law, human enhancement, and the ethics of artificial intelligence.

A version of this post was previously published here.

Somebody recently sent me a link to an article by Jed Radoff entitled “Why Innocent People Plead Guilty”. Radoff’s article is an indictment of the plea-bargaining system currently in operation in the US. Unsurprisingly given its title, it argues that the current system of plea bargaining encourages innocent people to plead guilty, and that something must be done to prevent this from happening.

I recently published a paper addressing the same problem. The gist of its argument is that I think that it may be possible to use a certain type of brain-based lie detection — the P300 Concealed Information Test (P300 CIT) — to rectify some of the problems inherent in systems of plea bargaining. The word “possible” is important here. I don’t believe that the technology is currently ready to be used in this way – I think further field testing needs to take place – but I don’t think the technology is as far away as some people might believe either.

What I find interesting is that, despite this, there is considerable resistance to the use of the P300 CIT in academic and legal circles. Some of that resistance stems from unwarranted fealty to the status quo, and some stems from legitimate concerns about potential abuses of the technology (miscarriages of justice etc.). I try to overcome some of this resistance by suggesting that the P300 CIT might be better than other proposed methods for resolving existing abuses of power within the system. Hence my focus on plea-bargaining and the innocence problem.

Anyway, in what follows I’ll try to give a basic outline of my argument. As ever, for the detail, you’ll have to read the original paper. Continue reading

McMahan’s Hazardous (and Irrelevant) Thought Experiment

Written by Professor Allen Buchanan and Professor Lance K. Stell  

 

This is a response to an earlier post, by Jeff McMahan, about the right to carry guns, http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/04/a-challenge-to-gun-rights.

Before we criticize McMahan’s argument, it is important to ascertain its implications: Assuming that, as McMahan thinks, there is no moral right to gun ownership, what follows, practically speaking? One might think that, given the number of gun deaths, it follows that there should be a legal ban on gun ownership. As we shall show, however, that conclusion does not follow.  Whether or not gun ownership should be banned is independent of whether there is a moral right to gun ownership. We will show that McMahan has not established that there is no moral right to gun ownership, but that even if he had, he would not have thereby shown that there should be a ban on gun ownership. Continue reading

Returning Looted Artworks

Written by Cecile Fabre, April 2015

 

In 1999, Maria Altman, who had fled Austria in 1938 following the Anschluss with Germany, filed a lawsuit against the Austrian government. Her claim was that five paintings by Gustav Klimt, had been looted by the Nazis from her uncle before falling into the possession of the Austrian authorities, and that these ought to be returned to her as the rightful heir. Two of the paintings included portraits of her aunt. The Austrians initially refused to take her request seriously but eventually gave in after several dramatic legal twists and turns.[1]

This story is now on our cinema screens under the title A Woman in Gold, with Helen Mirren in the starring role. The ending is clearly meant to be regarded as a happy one: after all, Altman does get the painting back. And, generally, many think that stolen or plundered works of art ought to be returned to those from whom they were taken, or their heirs. Continue reading

On the supposed distinction between culture and religion: A brief comment on Sir James Munby’s decision in the matter of B and G (children)

On the supposed distinction between culture and religion: A brief comment on Sir James Munby’s decision in the matter of B and G (children)

By Brian D. Earp (@briandavidearp)

Introduction

What is the difference between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ … ? From a legal standpoint, this question is important: practices which may be described as being ‘religious’ in nature are typically afforded much greater protection from interference by the state than those that are understood as being ‘merely’ cultural. One key area in which this distinction is commonly drawn is with respect to the non-therapeutic alterations of children’s genitals. When such alteration is done to female children, it is often said to be a ‘cultural’ practice that does not deserve legal protection; whereas, when it is done to male children, it is commonly said to be a ‘religious’ practice – at least for some groups – and must therefore not be restricted (much less forbidden) by law.

Is this a valid distinction?

Continue reading

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