Philosophy Lecturer, Royal Holloway University of London
Practical Ethics News will host the next Philosophers’ Carnival on 22nd September. If you know of a particularly good philosophy blog post, please consider nominating it for inclusion via this link. Posts need not be on the topic of practical ethics, although they should be accessible to a popular audience. Posts relating to current affairs… Read More »Practical Ethics News to host Philosophers’ Carnival
If, like
me, you were one of the kids whose preferred superpower was invisibility, you
may soon be in luck. The BBC reports
today that US scientists have
created a material that could one day be used to make people and objects invisible. The material, which has so far been created
only on a microscopic scale, neither absorbs nor reflects light,
meaning that anyone looking at an object covered in it would see what
lies behind the object rather than the object itself. It’s likely that such technology will be
snapped up first by the military, but perhaps, in years to come, invisibility
cloaks will be available to all.
For some,
the idea of being invisible is distasteful. Being invisible means being able to get away with anything – and
why bother to act morally when you can be sure that you’ll never be caught
out? In this case, would a world full of
people who can turn invisible at the drop of a hat be a world full of thieves,
cheats, and sneaks?
Read More »Would you rather be invisible or be able to fly? (Or: are you a sneaky superhero?)
Thirty
years after the first test-tube baby, Nature
asks various experts for their views on what the next thirty years of
reproductive medicine will bring.
Some of the more startling predictions are:
Read More »Reproductive science: is there something we’re missing?
The BBC
reports that the Japanese
town of Kamikatsu
has become the first ‘zero waste’ town. Residents
compost all of their food waste, and must sort the rest of their rubbish into
34 different categories—all of which they must take to public waste centres,
since there are no rubbish collections from people’s homes. It seems that the inhabitants of the town are
generally enthusiastic about the scheme, which offers small financial rewards
for recycling, and has encouraged people to make an effort to reduce the
rubbish they produce.
This is one
of those relatively rare, uplifting stories about a scheme designed to reduce
environmental damage that is not only successful, but supported by the
community. Could something similar work
in the UK? Recently, many UK councils reduced domestic refuse
collections from once-weekly to once-fortnightly, with recyclable waste being
collected in the intervening weeks. Whilst this has boosted the amount of rubbish being recycled,
some news reports
reveal that the new measures are unpopular, and some councils have bowed to
public pressure by re-introducing weekly collections. Given the environmental impact of adding to
landfill waste sites, ought the government to placate the public by relaxing
measures designed to reduce waste, or should unpopular measures be enforced
regardless of public opinion?
An interesting
article in The New York Times
describes how the way in which the brain forms memories can, over time,
lead to false information from noncredible sources being reinterpreted as true. The article notes that this may explain why
smear campaigns can be so effective in politics: those who spread misinformation ‘know that if
their message is initially memorable, its impression will persist long after it
is debunked’—and the rehashing of false information by victims during their defence simply adds to its plausibility in
the long term. It seems, then, that
what we believe may often be based not on truth or credibility, but on repetition and emotional
resonance.
The New
Scientist recently reviewed a variety of studies showing that many traits often supposed unique to humans are in fact shared by
animals. There is evidence that apes, dolphins,
songbirds, elephants, and monkeys share with humans some of the
most important aspects of behaviour associated with speech; killer whales have
distinct cultural groups; great apes and some monkeys have a degree of
understanding of the minds of others, enabling them to deceive; chimpanzees,
gorillas, and crows use tools; and there is suggestive evidence that elephants,
magpies, baboons, whales, and chimpanzees demonstrate emotional behaviour, and
that monkeys and rats are capable of drawing primitive moral distinctions.
Claims that animals have capacities usually thought
unique to humans are controversial, and those who make them are often accused
of anthropomorphising animal behaviour. Plausibly,
there is often more to such accusations than concern for explanatory
parsimony. As humans, we profit from
using animals—for food, research, sport, and so on—in ways that we would not
use other humans, and suggestions that animals are more like humans than we
usually suppose place an unwelcome demand on society to rethink its ethical stance
towards animals. This suggests that a
clear division between humans and other species is important to us in justifying
the discrepancies between what we view as ethical treatment of other humans and
what we view as ethical treatment of non-human animals. Pragmatically speaking, if we
humans wish to retain a privileged moral status, and if our privileged moral
status is at least partly due to our being different to other animals in
certain important (usually biologically-based) respects, then it is in our
interests to resist attempts to draw similarities between humans and other
animals.
Read More »Same species, different needs: could ‘genes for’ improve the way we treat animals?
New Scientist
reports this week claims that the reason human cognitive powers are so
superior to those of other animals has to do not with biology alone, but also
with our ability to interact with others and with the world.
Various news sources
this week, including Fox News and The Guardian, are reporting on an editorial published in this month’s American Journal of Psychiatry. In it, the author, Jerald J. Block, argues
that internet addiction is a real psychological disorder, and that it ought to
be recognised as such in DSM-V, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which is
currently being compiled by the American Psychiatric
Association.
The BBC
reports today that a compulsive gambler has failed in a High Court bid to make
the bookmaker William Hill repay £2 million of his gambling losses. The gambler, Graham Calvert, claimed that the
bookmaker failed in its ‘duty of care’ by allowing him to continue to place
bets after he had asked the company to close his account. The judge recognised that William Hill failed
to take ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent Calvert from gambling, but said that it
was probable that Calvert would have continued to gamble even had such steps
been taken, meaning that William Hill is not responsible for his losses.
Does a
bookmaker have a duty of care towards its customers? The judge in the case thought not, so let us
pose a far more modest question: ought a bookmaker to take ‘reasonable steps’
to prevent its customers from gambling in certain cases? Answering ‘yes’ to the latter question raises
a number of puzzling questions. For
example, what counts as a reasonable step, and under what circumstances ought
such a step to be taken? Consider the
reasons we might believe that pathological gambling is bad: I suggest that
three important reasons are (1) that it is irrational, in that the gambling
behaviour of pathological gamblers is highly unlikely to help realise their goal
of winning money and is highly likely to frustrate this goal; (2) that
pathological gamblers gamble often, and gamble more money than they can afford
to lose; and (3) because of (1) and (2), pathological gamblers are likely to
suffer large financial losses, which can disrupt other aspects of their lives,
such as their personal relationships, health, and career.
The BBC has
reported plans by the government to
ensure that all new homes are built to accommodate the needs of an ageing
population. Under these plans, new homes
would need to include features such as stairs wide enough to fit a stairlift,
downstairs bathrooms, and room for wheelchairs to turn. The plans are, reportedly, part of a wider
initiative to make entire neighbourhoods more old-people-friendly, through—for
example—building better pavements and kerbs, improving street lighting,
thoughtfully positioning bus stops, and ensuring access to amenities such as
toilets.
have been welcomed by organisations such as Help the Aged and Age Concern, who
believe that such measures will enable old people to live independently for as
long as possible. A spokesman for Help
the Aged is quoted as saying, ‘We live in an ageing population and our housing
must meet the needs of older people, both now and in the future’.
Read More »Stairlifts, wheelchairs, and radium-powered toasters
