David Velleman, in the only paper of which I am aware that makes a defensible case against euthanasia, suggests that sometimes expanding our range of options is a bad thing, even if we choose wisely from our options. Velleman gives the example of dueling: I may be better off for lacking (by law) the option of dueling, because were the option available to me, I might be better off accepting a challenge than losing face, but I am better off still if I am never challenged. Velleman’s utilizes this claim in arguing against the legalization of the right to die: if I have the option of dying, then I may feel that I am required to justify my existence, especially when my continuing life is an emotional and financial burden on my family.
What interests me, here, is how an existentialist might respond to this argument and might urge its generalization. Existentialists, in the mould of Jean-Paul Sartre, might say that policies that lead me to think that I must justify my existence are a good thing; they lead me to recognize what was in any case always true. It is bad faith, or inauthenticity, not to face squarely the fact that I implicitly choose, and therefore am responsible for, my existence.
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