punishment

Guest Post: Abortion, punishment and moral consistency

Written by: Rajiv Shah, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

Donald Trump suggested that women who have abortions should face punishment. For that he was criticised by both the pro-choice side and the pro-life side. The latter claimed that their view is that women should not face punishment for having abortions but that only providers should. This raises the interesting question of whether the pro-life position is coherent. It would seem that it is not. If the foetus has the right to life then having an abortion is like murder and so those who abort should be treated as such. This post argues that the pro-lifer can coherently reject this implication whilst still holding that the foetus has the right to life. Since it considers the responses a pro-lifer could make this post will assume for the sake of argument that the foetus does have a right to life. Continue reading

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: “The Justice of Punitive Wars” written by Benjamin Koons

This essay received an Honourable Mention in the graduate category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics.

Written by University of Oxford, Oriel College student Benjamin Koons

  1. Introduction

Contemporary just war theory has largely abandoned punishment as one of the just causes for war, but I intend to show that if one accepts the justice of defensive wars then punitive wars are plausibly justified. I defend this thesis:

Punishment as Just Cause (PJC): It is a just cause for international treaty organization X to initiate a war with member-state Y so as to punish Y for an injustice against state Z. Continue reading

Does the desire to punish have any place in modern justice?

Professor Neil Levy, visiting Leverhulme Lecturer, University of Oxford, has recently published a provocative essay at Aeon online magazine:

Human beings are a punitive species. Perhaps because we are social animals, and require the cooperation of others to achieve our goals, we are strongly disposed to punish those who take advantage of us. Those who ‘free-ride’, taking benefits to which they are not entitled, are subject to exclusion, the imposition of fines or harsher penalties. Wrongdoing arouses strong emotions in us, whether it is done to us, or to others. Our indignation and resentment have fuelled a dizzying variety of punitive practices – ostracism, branding, beheading, quartering, fining, and very many more. The details vary from place to place and time to culture but punishment has been a human universal, because it has been in our evolutionary interests. However, those evolutionary impulses are crude guides to how we should deal with offenders in contemporary society.

Our moral emotions fuel our impulses toward retribution. Retributivists believe that people should be punished because that’s what they deserve. Retributivism is not the only justification for punishment, of course. We also punish to deter others, to prevent the person offending again, and perhaps to rehabilitate the offender. But these consequentialist grounds alone cannot justify our current system of criminal justice. We want punishments to ‘fit the crime’ – the worse the crime, the worse the punishment – without regard for the evidence of whether it ‘works’, that is, without thinking about punishment in consequentialist terms.

See here for the full article, and to join in the conversation.

Professor Levy has also written on this topic in the Journal of Practical Ethics; Less Blame, Less Crime? The Practical Implications of Moral Responsibility Skepticism.

Guest Post: Vampire Judges and Blood Money: Blood Donation as Criminal Sanction?

Written by Christopher Chew

Monash University

Early one September morning, plaintiffs at a rural Alabama County court in the US, were greeted with an unexpected and highly unusual offer. To quote presiding Judge Marvin Wiggins:

“There’s a blood drive outside, and if you don’t have any money, and you don’t want to go to jail, as an option to pay it, you can give blood today…bring in a receipt indicating you gave blood…as a discount rather than putting you in jail…or the sheriff has enough handcuffs for those who do not have money.” Continue reading

Guest Post: Mental Health Disorders in Prison: Neuroethical and Societal Issues

 Guest post by Barbara Sahakian,

FMedSci, DSc, a professor in the department of psychiatry at the University of Cambridge,

and president of the International Neuroethics Society.

This article was originally published on the Dana Foundation Blog, and can be read here: http://danablog.org/2015/07/28/mental-health-disorders-in-prison-neuroethical-and-societal-issues/

More than half of all prison and jail inmates have a mental health problem.[i] In addition, according to a 2010 report released by the Treatment Advocacy Center and the National Sheriffs’ Association,[ii] more mentally ill persons are in jails and prisons than in hospitals, and many of those remain untreated. Those in prison have a higher risk of substance abuse, and suicide rates are four to five times higher than within the general population.[iii] Deaths are also increased upon release, with the most common reasons being drug overdose, cardiovascular disease, homicide, and suicide.[iv]

Many people in prison have lower than average IQs, and it is well-established that lower IQ is a known risk factor for mental health problems.[v] Rates of problems for children in the youth justice system are at least three times higher than within the general population, and are highest amongst children in custody.[vi] Almost a quarter of children who offend have very low IQs of less than 70.[vii]

At the International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting 2015 in Chicago (Oct. 15-16), there will be a panel entitled, “Mental health disorders in prison: Neuroethical and societal issues,” which will consider vulnerabilities to mental health problems of those in prison, and whether there are inequalities in access to psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals for diagnosis and treatment. This panel will also reflect on what steps, in terms of improving cognition, functionality, and wellbeing, society should be taking to ensure better life trajectories when inmates with mental health problems are released.

For example, suicide mortality is reduced by antidepressant treatment,[viii] and there is evidence that for at least some disorders, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), treatment leads to a significant reduction in criminality rates in men (Lichtenstein et al, 2012).[ix] Effective treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders and education, including skill training in prisons, could help to increase cognitive reserve and resilience, helping prisoners successfully address the many challenges encountered on release.[x]

The highly distinguished panel includes Dr. James Blair, Dr. Laurie R. Garduque, and Professor Hank Greely. The panel’s moderator, Dr. Alan Leshner, has been director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, deputy director and acting director of the National Institute of Mental Health, and chief executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He was one of the first to highlight the neuroscientific evidence of brain changes in addiction.

[i] James DJ, Glaze LE (2006) Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 213600

[ii] Torrey E, Kennard A, Eslinger D, Lamb R, Pavle J (2010) More Mentally Ill Persons are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals: A Survey of the States. Treatment Advocacy Center.

[iii] Fazel S, Grann M, Kling B, Hawton K (2011) Prison suicide in 12 countries: An ecological study of 861 suicides during 2003–2007. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol, 46, 191-195.

[iv] Binswanger IA, Stern MF, Deyo RA, Heagerty PJ, Cheadle A, Elmore JG, Koepsell TD (2007) Release from prison: A high risk of death for former inmates. New England Journal of Medicine, 356, 157-165.

[v] Barnett JH, Salmond CH, Jones PB, Sahakian BJ (2006) Cognitive reserve in neuropsychiatry. Psychological Medicine, 36, 1053-1064.

[vi] Hagell A (2002) The mental health needs of young offenders—a report commissioned by the Mental Health Foundation MHF: London.

[vii] Harrington R, Bailey S (2005) Mental health needs and effectiveness of provision for young offenders in custody and in the community YJB: London.

[viii] Morgan OWC, Griffiths C, Majeed A (2004) Association between mortality from suicide in England and antidepressant prescribing: an ecological study. BMC Public Health, 4.

[ix] Lictenstein P, Halldner L, Zetterqvist J, Sjolander A, Serlachius E, Fazel S, Langstrom N, Larsson H (2012) Medication for attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder and criminality. The New England Journal of Medicine, 367.

[x] Beddington J, Cooper CL, Field J, Goswami U, Huppert FA, Jenkins R, Jones HS, Kirkwood TB, Sahakian BJ, Thomas SM (2008) The mental wealth of nations. Nature, 23, 1057-1060.

Guest Post: Self defence and getting sacked

Written by Dr Nicholas Shackel

Cardiff University

 

If you were attacked at a work party you would expect the person who attacked you to get sacked. In this case (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11846084/London-Zoo-love-rivals-in-vicious-fight-over-llama-keeper.html) it seems to be the person attacked who got sacked, apparently because the boss doesn’t understand the right of self defence. Continue reading

Guest Post: Is it cruel to make children sit and work in silence?

Written By David Aldridge, Oxford Brookes University

This is a cross post from Dave Aldridge’s blog

 

Ahead of a talk to be given at the Institute of Education, Tom Bennett, behaviour guru and figurehead of the ResearchEd movement, invited questions via twitter that he hoped he could address in his seminar.  One tweeter asked “Is it cruel to make [children] read/ write/ think in silence?”  Bennett’s response on twitter was a one word, “no”, accompanied by this picture of guffawing muppets. Continue reading

Guest Post: Why it might be good to pamper terrorists

Written By Anders Herlitz

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

 One of the most heated debates in “Western” countries these days concerns how to deal with individuals who either have traveled or consider traveling to Syria or Iraq in order to join Daesh and return to a “Western” country in which they are citizens. Australia recently announced that they plan to strip Australian-born individuals who fight with Daesh of their Australian citizenship. The United Kingdom already has laws that allow them to strip citizens of their British nationality if it is “conductive to the public good.” Sweden, my home country, gained international attention in somewhat suspicious circles for what to many seemed to be the complete opposite approach to the problem: the city of Stockholm has outlined a plan for how to deal with members of extremist movements, which involves what they call inclusive measures such as assistance with finding housing as well as an occupation, but also health efforts needed to deal with trauma and PTSD that are expected to be common among participants in warfare. Needless to say perhaps, the idea that Swedish tax money could go to treat the trauma of a person who himself decided to travel to a foreign country to participate in barbarism has generated quite an emotional reaction. I’d like to take this opportunity to scratch the surface of the ethical problems of this general problem, show why Stockholm did the right thing, and underline that we are having really, really bad moral luck. Continue reading

Punishment and Memory

The public outcry at the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service that Lord Janner was not fit to stand trial for 22 sex offences, the last of which were allegedly committed in the 1980s, appears to have led the CPS to initiate a review. Janner’s case raises several issues about the punishment of crimes that may have taken place in the relatively distant past. Continue reading

Should we punish crimes from the distant past?

Former Auschwitz SS officer Oskar Gröning is currently being tried as an accessory to murder for his role as an administrator in the extermination camp, and the trial has stirred up a lot of debate. One strand of the debate addresses the question whether Gröning was complicit in the extermination of prisoners, and whether he was culpable for this complicity. (Roger Crisp wrote a fascinating post on this a couple of weeks back.) But another strand – and the strand that I want to look at here – has addressed the question whether former Nazi war criminals should be tried and punished for deeds in their distant past. Eva Mozes Kor, an Auschwitz survivor and witness in Gröning’s trial has claimed that he shouldn’t be tried, though he should use his knowledge to help fight holocaust denial.

Let’s suppose that Gröning was indeed a culpable accomplice to murder. Should he then be punished? More generally, should serious crimes from decades go be punished? My intuition is that they should, but reflecting on why I have found it is not straightforward to defend this view. Continue reading

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