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Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: The Moral Importance of Low Welfare Species

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This essay was the winner of the Graduate category of the 10th National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2024. Written by Jakob Lohmar. Many people believe that we sometimes ought to produce one larger benefit rather than any number of smaller benefits. For example, many believe that in a choice between saving a human… Read More »Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: The Moral Importance of Low Welfare Species

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Feminist in the Streets, Sadomasochist in the Sheets: Are You Morally Aligning Yourself With Women’s Subordination if You Engage in Consensually Inegalitarian Sexual Relationships?

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This article was the runner up in the undergraduate category of the 10th National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics. Written by Ayesha Chakravarti. I. Introduction Most feminists argue that “The personal is the political.” Is this true of people’s sex lives? In this essay, I will discuss the implications of having consensually inegalitarian sexual… Read More »Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Feminist in the Streets, Sadomasochist in the Sheets: Are You Morally Aligning Yourself With Women’s Subordination if You Engage in Consensually Inegalitarian Sexual Relationships?

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National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: When Eating Meat is OK: A Defence of Benign Carnivorism

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This article received an Honourable Mention in the undergraduate category of the 10th National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics. Written by David Logan. Benign Carnivorism (BC) is a practice where a farmer (i) creates animals with pleasurable lives worth living, (ii) painlessly kills them after a significant proportion of their natural lifespan, and (iii)… Read More »National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: When Eating Meat is OK: A Defence of Benign Carnivorism

Announcing the Winners and Runners Up in the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

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Please join us in congratulating all four of the finalists in the National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2024, and in particular our winners, Wyatt Radzin and Jakob Lohmar. We would also like to thank our judges, Prof Roger Crisp, Prof Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Dr Cristina Voinea. This, the final of the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro… Read More »Announcing the Winners and Runners Up in the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

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National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: To What Extent Has Aristotle’s Conception of a Virtuous Character Remained Relevant in the Face of Situationist Criticism?

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This article received an honourable mention in the undergraduate category of the 2024 National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics. Written by Gabriel McWilliams. The concept of a virtuous character is a foundational tenet of the broader virtue ethics doctrine. It has, though, been subject to noteworthy objection. One such objection arises from the theory of… Read More »National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: To What Extent Has Aristotle’s Conception of a Virtuous Character Remained Relevant in the Face of Situationist Criticism?

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National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Undisclosed Conversational AIs: A Threat to Users’ Autonomy

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This article received an honourable mention in the graduate category of the 2024 National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics. Written by Beatrice Marchegiani. Introduction Recent advancements in Large Language Models have enabled AI systems to engage in conversations with users that are virtually indistinguishable from human interactions. The proliferation of advanced Conversational AIs (CAIs)1… Read More »National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Undisclosed Conversational AIs: A Threat to Users’ Autonomy

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Turning up the Hedonic Treadmill: Is It Morally Impermissible for Parents to Give Their Children a Luxurious Standard of Living?

This essay was the overall winner in the Undergraduate Category of the 2023 National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Written by University of Oxford student, Lukas Joosten

Most parents think they are helping their children when they give them a very high standard of life. This essay argues that giving luxuries to your children can, in fact, be morally impermissible. The core of my argument is that when parents give their children a luxurious standard of life, they foist an expectation for a higher standard of living upon their children, reducing their lifetime wellbeing if they cannot afford this standard in adulthood.

I argue for this conclusion in four steps. Firstly, I discuss how one can harm someone by changing their preferences. Secondly, I develop a model for the general permissibility of gift giving in the context of adaptive preferences. Thirdly, I apply this to the case of parental giving, arguing it is uniquely problematic. Lastly, I respond to a series of objections to the main argument.  Read More »Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Turning up the Hedonic Treadmill: Is It Morally Impermissible for Parents to Give Their Children a Luxurious Standard of Living?

Why Actions Matter: The Case for Fluid Moral Status

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This article received an honourable mention in the graduate category of the 2023 National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Written by Lucy Simpson, Nottingham Trent University student

 

Throughout the catalogue of work produced by Jeff McMahan, he has discussed what constitutes a being’s moral status, and has advocated the theories of moral individualism and reflective equilibrium intuitionism.[1] It is not my intention in this paper to dispute  these positions. Instead, I argue that if we accept McMahan’s position, then logically, we must accept that a being’s moral character is a morally relevant property which we ought to consider when determining their moral status. As I will explain, this therefore means that moral status is not static; it is fluid. Further to this, in the latter stages of this paper, I consider that if we do accept that moral status is action dependant, then there might be negative moral status. On the topic of negative moral status, I do not aim to give any in-depth arguments either for or against its existence, but rather just flag this as a potential avenue for further exploration if we do indeed follow McMahan’s theories of intuitionism and moral individualism.Read More »Why Actions Matter: The Case for Fluid Moral Status

Do we have an Obligation to Diversify our Media Consumption ?

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This article received an honourable mention in the graduate category of the 2023 National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Written by James Shearer, University of St Andrews student

  1. Introduction 

In an increasingly politicised society, previously mundane decisions about our daily lives can take on normative qualities. One such question is “what news media should we consume?”. Alex Worsnip suggests that we have an obligation to consume media from across the political landscape. This essay argues against this claim by showing that any obligation to diversify our media consumption in this way would face severe limitations. §2 will consider Worsnip’s argument. §3 will show why we are under no general obligation to diversify our media consumption. Finally, in §4 I consider and respond to potential responses to my position.

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