Skip to content

practical ethics

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: The Moral Importance of Low Welfare Species

  • by

This essay was the winner of the Graduate category of the 10th National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2024. Written by Jakob Lohmar. Many people believe that we sometimes ought to produce one larger benefit rather than any number of smaller benefits. For example, many believe that in a choice between saving a human… Read More »Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: The Moral Importance of Low Welfare Species

Announcing the Winners and Runners Up in the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

  • by

Please join us in congratulating all four of the finalists in the National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2024, and in particular our winners, Wyatt Radzin and Jakob Lohmar. We would also like to thank our judges, Prof Roger Crisp, Prof Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Dr Cristina Voinea. This, the final of the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro… Read More »Announcing the Winners and Runners Up in the 10th Annual National Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Why We Should Negatively Discount the Well-Being of Future Generations

This essay was the winner in the undergraduate category of the 8th Annual Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

Written by Matthew Price, University of Oxford Student

Practical ethicists and policymakers alike must grapple with the problem of how to weigh the interests of future people against those of contemporary people. This question is most often raised in discussions about our responsibility to abate climate change,1 but it is also pertinent to the mitigation of other existential risks, disposal of nuclear waste, and investment in long-term scientific enterprise. To date, most of the debate has been between those who defend the practice of discounting future generations’ well-being at some positive rate and those who argue that the only morally defensible discount rate is zero.2 This essay presents an argument for a negative discount rate:

  • There is reason to believe that the well-being of those who are more morally deserving counts for more.
  • There is reason to expect that future people will be more morally deserving than we are now.

Read More »Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Why We Should Negatively Discount the Well-Being of Future Generations

What is ‘Practical’ Ethics?

By Roger Crisp

This is an exciting time for practical ethics in Oxford. The University has recently launched a new Masters in Practical Ethics, organized by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and the Department for Continuing Education. Applicants are currently being assessed for admission, and the course begins in earnest in October.

But what makes ethics – by which I mean philosophical ethics – ‘practical’ (or ‘applied’)? It’s true that a good deal of philosophical work in ethics is at the ‘meta-level’, covering issues such as the truth-aptness of moral judgements or the metaphysics of moral properties. But isn’t the rest of it, if it’s not ‘meta’ and not merely clarificatory, all going to be practical, in some straightforward sense?

Read More »What is ‘Practical’ Ethics?

If You Had to Choose, Would You Say Chimpanzees Are Persons or Things?

Photo Credit: Rennett Stowe

In everyday speech, the term ‘person’ often means roughly the same thing as ‘human,’ which in turn refers to someone who belongs to the species Homo sapiens. However, in practical ethics and in philosophy more broadly, the term ‘person’ has a much more rich, and more complicated, history. Read More »If You Had to Choose, Would You Say Chimpanzees Are Persons or Things?