MSt in Practical Ethics

Applications for the October 2018 entry in the new MSt in Practical Ethics, taught by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics,   are now closed.  However, to express interest in the 2019-20 course please visit our website here.

Applications for the modules as standalone courses are still open.

This flexible, part -time course consists of six modules and a dissertation. The MSt in Practical Ethics is a part-time course consisting of six taught modules and a dissertation. Modules may also be taken as standalone courses. Continue reading

Should Gene Editing Be Compulsory?

Written by Julian Savulescu

Hypothetical Case 1: Enzyme Replacement Therapy for Gaucher’s Disease

Consider a hypothetical version of a real life disease, Gaucher’s Disease. Gaucher’s disease is an inherited disorder caused by a genetic mutation. The mutation means an enzyme–  glucocerebrosidase — is not produced. A a result, glucerebrosides (fats) build up, damaging cells. This can cause bone fractures, liver enlargement, and bleeding but most importantly, brain damage. Once this has occurred it is irreversible.

Enzyme Replacement Therapy (ERT) is now available and for the purposes of this hypothetical case, the treatment offered, if given from the moment of birth, will prevent all damage (in real life current enzyme replacement treatments do prevent most symptoms, but do not affect nervous system involvement).

In our hypothetical case, a child is born to parents known to carry the mutation for Gaucher’s Disease, and prenatal testing has already confirmed that the baby is affected. ERT must be started at birth in order to prevent brain and other damage. However, the parents are Christian Scientists and refuse medical treatment. They believe prayer can cure their child’s condition.

Doctors are concerned the missing enzyme needs to be replaced before the child’s brain is damaged. They take the case to court where judges agree that therapy is in the child’s best interests.

Continue reading

In Defence of Trashing

Written by University of Oxford DPhil student, Tena Thau

Prior to this year’s final exams, Oxford University announced a crackdown on “trashing,” the post-exam tradition of dousing finalists in champagne, ‘silly string,’ confetti, and the like.   In conjunction with this announcement, the University released a memo outlining its objections to trashing.

In Part I of this post, I will present a point-by-point refutation of the arguments made in this memo. In Part II, I will sketch out what I think is the central moral concern with trashing: that it is an expression of elitism.  I will conclude that this ‘elitism objection’ to trashing should be rejected, showing why it is not trashing – but rather, the campaign against it – that is guilty of elitism. Continue reading

What’s Wrong With Simulation in Football?

Written by Doug McConnell

The 2018 edition of the football world cup has brought with it a renewed bout of hand wringing over ‘simulation’, e.g. players falling, diving, and tumbling under imaginary fouls, rolling around in mock pain, or clasping their faces pretending to have been hit. Stuart James writes in the Guardian that “play-acting has been commonplace at this World Cup. It’s become a cancer in the game, not just a stain on it, and Fifa needs to find a cure.” But what exactly is wrong with this behaviour? Why is the rise of this behaviour ‘a cancer in the game’? Continue reading

Video Interview: Richard Holton on Addiction

Is addiction within or beyond our control? What turns something into an addiction? What should we do (more of) to tackle addiction? In this interview with Dr Katrien Devolder (philosophy, Oxford), Professor Richard Holton (philosophy, Cambridge) discusses these questions.

 

The Psychology of Uncertainty, Vaccinations, and Protecting the Most Vulnerable: Was Rawls Right After All?

written by Andreas Kappes (@AnKappes), Anne-Marie Nußberger (@amnussberger ), Molly Crockett (@mollycrockett ) & Julian Savulescu  (@juliansavulescu)

Measles is making a comeback in Britain and Europe with numbers rising to record levels this year. Last year in Europe, measles killed 35 people, including young children . The re-emergence of measles can be traced to falling rates of vaccination and might make you want to re-think your summer plans. Crowded environments with low levels of hygiene, also known as summer festivals, are something to avoid if unsure about whether you have been properly vaccinated. And maybe re-think going for holidays to Romania, Italy and Greece, the countries with the highest rates of measles outbreaks this year.

But of course, even if you are not vaccinated, your chances of getting measles are low. And if you are infected, dying from measles is rare. The people that die during measles outbreaks are vulnerable babies that are too young to be vaccinated and unvaccinated people with compromised immune systems. And what are the chances that you infect one of these vulnerable people? Extremely low. Your intuition then might be that even if you are unsure about your vaccination status, the low odds don’t seem to justify the effort to engage with the NHS or any other health care provider. Maximize your benefits, and others will surely be fine. Individually, this feels right, but for the communities and countries we live in, this is disastrous, slowly eroding herd immunity that protects the most vulnerable.

Continue reading

Pain for Ethicists #2: Is the Cerebral Cortex Required for Pain? (Video)

Here’s my presentation from the UQAM 2018 Summer School in Animal Cognition organised by Stevan Harnad:

I also highly recommend Jonathan Birch’s talk on Animal Sentience and the Precautionary Principle and Lars Chittka’s amazing presentation about the minds of bees.

Thanks again to EA Grants for supporting this research as well as my home institutions Uehiro & WEH. And thanks to Mélissa Desrochers for the video.

You can find the first Pain for Ethicists post here.

Adam Shriver is a Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities.

Follow him on Twitter.

Video Interview: Richard Holton on Dementia and the Social Self

In this interview with Dr Katrien Devolder (Philosophy, Oxford), Professor Richard Holton (Philosophy, Cambridge) argues that those interacting with people suffering from dementia have an important role to play in buttressing their identity. He also discusses the implications of his views for the role of family and friends in medical decision-making for those with dementia, and for the thorny ethical question of whether doctors should respect their advance directives.

Free Will Sceptics: We’re Not So Bad.

Written by Neil Levy

A number of philosophers and psychologists suggest that belief in free will – whether it is true or not – is important, because it promotes prosocial behavior. People who disbelieve in free will might become fatalists, holding that their choices make no difference to how events play out, because they’re already determined (say). They might think that our lives lack value, in the absence of free will, and therefore that they do not deserve respect. There is, on most accounts of free will, a close link between free will and moral responsibility: if we lack free will, we’re not morally responsible. This link provides a third path whereby lack of belief in free will might lead to antisocial behavior: because people believe that they do not deserve blame for acting badly, they might be less motivated to act well. Continue reading

Pain for Ethicists: What is the Affective Dimension of Pain?

This is my first post in a series highlighting current pain science that is relevant to philosophers writing about well-being and ethics.  My work on this topic has been supported by the W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics, the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, as well as a generous grant from Effective Altruism Grants

There have been numerous published cases in the scientific literature of patients who, for various reasons, report feeling pain but not finding the pain unpleasant. As Daniel Dennett noted in his seminal paper “Why You Can’t Make A Computer That Feels Pain,” these reports seem to be at odds with some of our most basic intuitions about pain, in particular the conjunction of our intuitions that ‘‘a pain is something we mind’’ and ‘‘we know when we are having a pain.’’ Dennett was discussing the effects of morphine, but similar dissociations have been reported in patients who undergo cingulotomies to treat terminal cancer pain and in extremely rare cases called “pain asymbolia” involving damage to the insula cortex. Continue reading

Spineless Ethics

Written by Roger Crisp

Last week, at a seminar organized jointly by the Oxford Uehiro Centre and the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, Prof. Irina Mikhalevich presented a fascinating preview of a paper (‘Minds Without Spines: Toward a More Comprehensive Animal Ethics’) which forms part of a project she has been working on with Prof. Russell Powell. Continue reading

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